I once drove aimlessly along a highway from Clearwater to Largo, and while on this trip I witnessed the capricious nature of human intentionality. Although I never thought about it much, I always thought myself I cautious person. Yet, I recall driving along this road (likely listening to an album I had purchased because of the artist’s faint link to another artist whom I thought melded well the dusty with digital, and also just conscious enough not to acquaint myself with the ass end of whatever coasted ahead in my lane) and slowly approaching a vehicle with an illegible bumper sticker (at least for someone with my level of myopia). I’m not the type to pull ever closer to another car’s rear bumper cover so that I might catch the comedic gem packaged and presented so economically (they often annoy me, actually), but for whatever reason I took the first break in cruising to grasp the insight offered within said package. And, it went a little something like this:

“If animals could talk, we’d all be vegetarians.”

Someone, I recall, quipped, “So. If vaginas could talk, we’d (men) all be gay.” But, I never ate vagina to begin with, so I suppose this is irrelevant.

[Note: discussing the tastelessness of the above joke will only spark a string of even cruder retorts (I’ve played this out in my mind).]

My reaction, though, surprised me. I read the bumper sticker, let it soak in for a time, and then repeated the sentiment (this time aloud), “If animals could talk, we all would be vegetarians.” Inasmuch as I think the claim is painfully straightforward (the underlying assumptions, too, are no mystery), I’m not going to interpret the statement here. I will say, though, that since reading that sticker, I have eschewed eating meats.

It was, in fact, quite easy for me to “adjust” my diet. I suppose this contributed to the gap between reading the bumper sticker and grasping its impact, as it was a full year later when I first attempted to understand my position. Looking back, I’m not sure I would have ever made such a hasty choice (knowing at the time that my choice, while impulsive, was made because I thought morality demanded it). Luckily this is one of those choices where the negative externalities (of my actions alone) are negligible and, understanding them more fully now, so small that they do not overcome even the superficial moral problems with an omnivorous diet. Nonetheless, this choice was actually quite reckless. Although this decision seems sound now, the effects of impulse are potentially quite devastating, and one might wonder whether this suggests an obligation to, at the very least, investigate the possibility of a moral demand for eliminating capricious choices. If you are unable to control your decision making (in every practical, morally relevant way), perhaps avoiding such choices is required. I think it is worth exploring.

For a couple of years now, though, I've attempted to reconcile the vegetarian ethic with eating animal byproducts. As a practical matter, this is impossible for most American citizens. It is quite difficult to locate milks, cheeses, and the like that are obtained through a process that does not, in some fashion, frustrate the interests of non-human animals.

Even if locating byproducts obtained in this manner were a simple task, though, this would not quite reconcile the two, but rather eliminate the problem entirely.

The attempted reconciliation relied on the different interests at stake in the two cases. It was likely the most intellectually lazy and abhorrent attempt that I have ever made to rationalize a morally odious behavior, and for it I am ashamed.

But, it reminds me that I am not beyond disingenuous argumentation, and that I must be vigilant in removing these sorts of obstructions along the road to moral clarity.

And so now I contemplate the proper course of action necessary to prevent suffering among those beings to which I have become sensitive. This question applies to most moral claims – once you make them, what call to action (if any) should you make? In many cases the direct approach is the least effective, particularly if the hurt/harm caused is not one that is either commonly accepted as a wrong or accepted by the agent as a wrong. The sentimental approach, while often effective, seems to lie on the most precarious ground. Reason is as reason does, and unorthodox methods are sketchy and unproven. What to do? The dilemma is astounding, really. The literature offers nothing of value, really, to the awkward moral question of what action is appropriate when preventing a moral wrong through others. This is the type of question that causes moral aphasia, and neither I, nor anyone else, can afford the block. So many questions, so little time...

Hend's Comments (sorry about inserting the wrong URL in here, I didn't notice that until just now)

Hend's Remix

Kevin's Remix and a Subsequent Dialogue between Cory and Kevin

David's Remix and Cory's Response

Final Narrative

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