The Absurdity of Non-universal Instrumentalism

This is an introduction (though not in the sense of a prologue, but rather more like a snippet) to a hitherto unwritten treatise on instrumentalism as a philosophy of science and its implications for moral objectivism. I will say that I would have liked to have had more time to consider the innumerable problems with several positions of contrasting epistemological camps, but I am confident that I will present something of a coherent case for accepting moral objectivism as equally conceivable as objective explanations of natural phenomena.

This essay does not attempt to defend any particular moral claims, nor does it attempt to defend the moral objectivist position. I will not even claim that normative judgments are necessarily possible, in any sense, but only that:

– insofar as something resembling an objective explanation of natural phenomena is possible, so, too, is an objective normative judgment

– your own views (and actions) are probably logically inconsistent with any view that rejects the existence of objective value, and certainly inconsistent with any view that rejects that reason is an effective mechanism for making value judgments

What is Science?

Science is generally delineated in two distinct ways, yet often understood as one, collective entity. Science is understood both as a method for acquiring what is deemed an objective understanding of reality and the bodies of knowledge acquired through said method (though, strictly speaking, it is a methodology). It will be necessary for me to invoke both senses of the term in this essay (the latter sparingly, though), and I am obliged to prepare the reader for this semantic vacillation. Note that it should be quite clear in which sense I am using the term at any given time, and that if prepared, one should not be befuddled by this ambiguity.

As a method, science tends to work in this fashion: a baseline observation of a fact is made (where a fact is understood as a verifiable truth), a hypothesis (or set of) explaining that observation is constructed, and the hypothesis is tested. If the test(s) indicates that the hypothesis(s) is false, that hypothesis(s) is refuted and a new explanation is postulated and tested. If the test does not refute, but rather supports the hypothesis(s), the hypothesis(s) will be subjected to a battery of tests. And, if a given set continues to hold up to scrutiny, it is deemed a scientific theory (a set of supported hypotheses). This is an abstraction of the methodology that I think fairly represents most people’s understanding of its nature.

There is, though, one key element missing in this description – reason. Reason is the mechanism by which observation and experimentation gain their explanatory authority. To that end, no information gathering device utilized in any of the ‘sciences’ has more than superficial epistemological utility without the introduction of reason to the process. Notice that if one takes any experiment, survey, constellation of studies, whatever, by themselves, one has nothing vis-à-vis explanation. Just as observation tells us nothing other than that which is observed (i.e. observing P, at most means P and only P), experimentation and the like reveals only more observable data – it does not offer an explanation. That is where analysis and interpretation of the data come into play. It is at this juncture that what is essentially trivial becomes valuable. So, the scientific method filters all explanatory claims concerning natural phenomena via principles of logic, namely deduction, induction, and abduction.

Even here, though, one must be careful not to assume too much from this description, for while this method is founded in a philosophy of empiricism and scientific realism – that is, it relies both on a belief that there are objective, observable facts and that natural phenomena are best understood through scientific explanation – it does not follow necessarily that this method ensures wholly objective claims. Notice that the method is an attempt to make objective claims. In fact, it is merely an attempt to explain observable facts. It does not necessarily do either. What perhaps is most important to note, though, is that the scientific method as an explanatory tool relies not only on observation, but imagination; that is, it requires users to imagine what might be (what is potentially discover- or determinable), and not what is.

Key Assumptions

If one accepts that the scientific method is an effective device for explaining natural phenomena (what is commonly understood as acquiring knowledge), one is tacitly accepting several assumptions.

First, one either accepts a) that there are objective, observable facts that actually exist, or if there are not, then b) subjective observations of phenomena are representations of some form of a consistent reality. Reliability would suffer markedly if experiments did not contain some consistent reality and were not performed under consistent conditions.

Second, we have by our perceptive faculties (e.g. senses of sight, smell, hearing, touch, and taste) an ability to know physical or natural truths; that is to say that we are in a position to perceive reality. This assumption either entails that there is no requirement to justify observations (to show them to be objective truths), rendering observations self-evident axioms of reality, or that observations are justified by virtue of a circuitous faith in the explanatory power of the scientific method (e.g. one is justified in believing that what they have seen is in fact reality because, through the varying applications of the scientific method, we have shown that the eyes of every person function in a more or less identical way and perceive a more or less identical image). To be fair, I will assume the former.

Third, logic (and here I mean the application of formal logical principles) is how reasoning ought to occur when explaining natural phenomena (i.e. acquiring knowledge). It is necessarily a prescriptive assumption (for now I will ignore how this might deconstruct an argument for relativism).

Therefore, when one accepts that the scientific method is an effective device for explaining natural phenomena, one, too, accepts that there is, at the very least, a consistent reality (if not objective) that we are capable of perceiving and explaining through the application of formal logic. Note that this inevitably means that one can never explain natural phenomena with certainty through the scientific method, but only provide a choice (or choices) that best explain natural phenomena based on a priori assumptions and logical inferences.

Implications for Moral Objectivism

To accept that the scientific method effectively explains natural phenomena necessitates accepting several other assumptions. It is interesting to note that some of these very assumptions are often called into question as it concerns moral claims.

First, that we are in a position to make moral judgments is seen as absurd. By what sense does one come to know moral reality (what one ought to (not) do)? But, it seems no more absurd to base moral claims on fundamental assumptions of ‘good’ or ‘right’ (e.g. inflicting undue and unwanted pain is bad/wrong) than to appeal to foundational knowledge about observations. In both cases, claims are at their base premised on fundamental assumptions about what is (assumptions of reality), and I can see no reason to believe that one assumption is probably true while the other is probably false.

Second, that we can apply logic to determine whether a given act is permissible is seen as at best naïve, and at worst hubristic. This, of course, relies on the first rejected assumption (that we cannot know moral truths), but it also reveals a distinct substantive contradiction. Part of the problem with utilizing logic to make definitive moral claims, it is argued, is that moral terms are too ambiguous and thus a consensus can never be had; that is, people will never agree on the definitions of terms or whether an argument cogently articulates a moral truth. This is a pseudo-problem, though, as moral terms in logical arguments are defined operationally (as in scientific claims), and consensus concerning the cogency of an argument is hardly a requirement of truth (as with scientific claims). Indeed, when applied to an explanation of natural phenomena, it would seem absurd to set such a standard (one can imagine any number of examples where consensus does not exist as it concerns scientific ‘laws’ (consider the modern evolutionary synthesis) as well as examples where consensus concerning scientific ‘laws’ did not guarantee truth (consider classical physics)). So, if, for example, one did not agree with the operational definition of an essential term in a moral claim, this would not affect the veracity of the claim, because the claim only refers to the given operational definition of the term. The same can be said for scientific claims (consider psychological claims about human intelligence). And, if one did not find a moral argument cogent, this, too would not affect the veracity of the claim, because whether people are convinced by a claim is descriptive and says nothing about whether people should be (consider the transformation of our understandings of our planet (flat Earth – more or less spherical Earth) and our universe (geocentric – heliocentric – omni-centric)).

It is interesting, too, to note the implications of moral skepticism. To deny that there are objective values, or that we are in a position to know such values should they exist, would necessarily imply that one should only vet one’s decisions on prudential grounds. After all, if objective values cannot be known, an appeal to ‘morality’ would be nonsensical. Yet, I doubt that any skeptic is so bold as to always ignore what others might call moral considerations. Also, if would seem that by extension, denying that one can make objective normative judgments would undermine the reliability of the scientific method, as the same assumptions necessarily rejected in the case of the former are integral to the reliability of the latter.

Closing Remarks

I would like to reiterate that this essay makes no claims about whether there are objective values or whether objective normative judgments can be made, but only that insofar as something resembling an objective explanation of natural phenomena is possible, so, too is an objective normative judgment. Further, this essay does not deny that objective explanations of natural phenomena are possible, nor does it affirm it. This essay only posits that all claims, whether scientific, prudential, aesthetic, or moral, are necessarily subjective in that they necessitate a priori assumptions and linguistic ambiguity, and that not one of these claims is clearly more objective than another insofar as they all utilize the same explanatory mechanism – reason.

Note: I recognize that the closing sentence is potentially the most controversial of the essay, but I implore the reader to closely analyze how the claim is worded (insofar as) and understand that claims (prudential, aesthetic, or otherwise) that do not fit this description are not being discussed here. So, for example, an aesthetic claim that yellow is pretty is no more a claim than a description of ones ‘natural’ inclination, and as such is both not a claim at all, and not what I am referring to in my closing remarks.

- Cory

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