Before taking a stab at solving this conundrum, I will make two assumptions that I think reasonable considering the context within which the question was posed. My first assumption is that this is a moral dilemma, and as such questions of aesthetics, prudence, and so on are of no concern. My second assumption is that second scenario involves more than a broken glass, but also a broken promise and that such a promise (to commit or refrain from certain acts) does not exist in the first, because if there was not a promise in either case, there is no moral question. Conversely, if in both cases there was a broken promise (and assuming the information presented is the only morally relevant information (i.e. there is not other issues such as pain caused by the act, which would pit consequentialism and virtue ethics against each other)), and assuming the promise in both cases was of equal weight, and assuming that child had no reason to believe that his/her actions would likely result in the broken glasses, then the number of glasses broken is morally irrelevant. I think not making these two assumptions (a. this is a moral question, and b. this is the only morally relevant information available, and therefore a promise is implied in the second scenario), the question is not a moral one, and to make it one would require writing the narrative from which this case was extracted – a book on practical ethics.

With the assumptions on the table, the question is simple. The first scenario presents no moral issue. The second does (broken promise (e.g. don’t try to grab for a jar when we (parents) are not home)), and therefore the act is morally worse by default.

I would like to respond, briefly, to Stephen’s comment that he doesn’t “believe in accidents.” I think, as he’s framed it, he probably does believe in accidents, and particularly accidents in the sense in which they’re described here. Here, an accident is an event caused by a human act (or lack thereof) without intent (and, to narrow that even further, an event that the agent did not have reason to believe was likely to occur as a result of his/her action/inaction). Inasmuch as these events do occur, to say one does not believe in them would be bizarre. But, I think he means something quite different, and in fact is not referring to the type of action described here (though he claims to be).

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